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1. At the meeting of the Zonal Vorstand of the CDU the demand was made that candidates for the CDU Vorstand, which is to be re-elected in the coming weeks, each make a statement of full agreement with the political line of the CDU party convention.
2. As a result of his sojourn in Moscow, Georg Dertinger had the following to say about the views which have been expressed to the effect that the beginning of the end has come for the bourgeois parties. This opinion, Dertinger claimed, could be completely refuted on the basis of firm promises made by Moscow. To be sure, certain groups among the LDP might lose a few feathers in the near future, but this is caused by the resistance of these groups to the necessary system of planned economy. In Moscow, Dertinger was told that the entire Orient plus the German area is being organized within a unified, economic plan for the exchange of goods and services, and that the CDU has thus far placed all its political thinking at the service of this political conception just as much as the SED. But what particularly convinced Dertinger of the sincerity of the Soviet intentions in regard to the CDU was the remark that the SED today no longer does nor can promulgate an economic system of a radical Marxist type and that this will be even less possible in the future; all the more so, since the USSR, as the center of this great economic organization of countries and states, is itself moving ever further from primitive Marxism.
3. Dertinger further stated that the CDU will no longer be merely a party tolerated by the USSR. He was told that the so-called system of a People's Democracy will not by any means be applied to the German area. The SED, to be sure, has adopted the view that the bloc system is gradually leading to the dissolution of the parties in favor of one ruling party. There is no doubt that while Tyulpanov was running the political life of the Russian Zone this view was shared by many. Dertinger's conversations in Moscow have left no doubt that Tyulpanov is not directing German policy in Moscow, but that he has on the contrary taken a professorship in Leningrad and no longer has any influence on German politics.
4. Dertinger said that he has a definite promise from Molotov and Vishinsky, as well as from other Moscow leaders, that the conversion of the Russian Zone into a People's Democracy is for many reasons no longer being considered, that it is in fact completely out of the question. Everyone in Moscow spoke to him of the same program which is one of uniting Germany at any price. In this connection

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he was told that in order to attain this goal, which is foreign relations problem number 1 of the USSR, the use of revolutionary-socialistic organizations and programs is completely impossible, and that what is needed is a willingness on the part of all organizations not directly controlled by Moscow to come to some rational agreement.

5. Moscow realizes that the reputation of the CDU of the Russian Zone is not very high in western Germany and that it has been weakened mainly by the demands of the SED, but Moscow considers that since the CDU of the Eastern Zone will scarcely be able to establish worthwhile contacts with the Western Zone CDU, granting privileges, assistance or liberties to the CDU would only be harmful and would have the opposite result to that desired. Connections with western Germany must be established and maintained in some other way than through the party. However, it is hoped that the impression will grow that the position of the CDU in the Russian Zone is by no means a mere tactical and temporary concession but rather results from genuine recognition of varying political principles.
 6. Dertinger went on to say that Soviet policy on a grand scale is basically aimed at cooperation between the East and the West, so that the CDU must work for a long time as a negotiator and will only be able to play a decisive part in pan-Germanic history at a much later date. Dertinger emphasized that these views are Moscow's.
 7. The first phase of the eastern approach to western Germany will consist of large economic offers, of attempts for barter, and of improved transportation relations. Realistic connections of all kinds between eastern and western Germany are sought by both sides, and the actual political line will merely serve to bind together these connections. In the meantime it is necessary to incorporate the DDR within the Eastern European system by means of agreements and treaties of all kinds with the nations of the Soviet bloc. This requires within the Russian Zone a development which will greatly change the present war-time appearance of the Zone. The latest plan is to establish the government of the Russian Zone so firmly that eventually sound relations between eastern and western Germany can be established. The Soviet Union fully realizes that its sphere of influence can never be extended to all of Germany if the DDR becomes a People's Democracy, but the USSR also knows that a united Germany will never form the basis for a People's Democracy. Yet with the support of the Soviet Union, a united Germany can become an important factor in the attainment of peace.
- 25X1 Comment: Dertinger's views were criticized by the other CDU leaders present as being far too optimistic. It was suggested that much of what he claimed was promised by Moscow was actually only his own imagination. Dertinger refused to waver in his position even in the face of so much incredulity.

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